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The European integrative experiment rests on a dynamic equilibrium of 
intergovernmental and supranational features of the regulatory framework of the 
European Union. One of the most important challenges to this system currently lies in 
finding ways to maintain its capacity to operate and, at the same time, adapt its 
problem-solving instruments to changing conditions of the regulatory politics. The 
current pragmatic mix of regulative strategies employed in the European Union allows 
for different possible scenarios concerning future development of the regulatory 
system within the EU.  
The article analyses the emergence and proliferation of new forms of decision-making 
and related legal techniques in the European Union. The origins and possible 
trajectory of a whole spectrum of contemporary legal techniques and governance 
methods, ranging from 'hard' to 'soft', are being contextualized. Special attention is 
given to the Open Method of Coordination and examples of its application in the 
social policy field. 
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This article analyses the emergence and proliferation of new forms of 
decision-making and their legal techniques in the European Union (EU). A special 
attention is given to the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and examples of its 
application in the social field at the European level.  
 
The contemporary EU is a highly institutionalized template for integration, equipped 
with different models of operation, which range from supranational to 
intergovernmental methods
1. The recourse to a single process of integration, based on 
a single legal format, has been made untenable by several waves of enlargement and 
additions of new competences
2, which have amplified respectively variability among 
interests of the member states and diversity of tackled issues. The center of gravity in 
the EU is fluctuating between two opposed methodologies of integration: one more 
supranational and another more intergovernmental. As a consequence, the policy-
making process is far from being a coherent combination of supranational 
institutionalization, teleological integration and the Community method of decision-
making. There is a growing tension between the traditional sectors of integration, with 
a more routinized manner of decision-making, and a new block of areas, where 
experimental forms of integration are under way
3. Interestingly, all the newer forms of 
EU integration have used non-binding legal instruments and developed a complex 
relationship with the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
 
Despite the introduction of new forms of integration, however, certain characteristics 
of traditional European regulation are resilient. According to a historical neo-
institutional perspective, reform of the rule-making mechanisms encounters resistance 
from institutionalized patterns and vested interests of the supranational bodies. The 
latter have a pre-eminent position in the reform process and defend their role in the 
                                                 
1 Helen Wallace, William Wallace (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Union 4th ed (Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 
2 Mark Pollack, “Creeping Competences: The Expanding Agenda of the European Communities”, 
Journal of Public Policy, 14:2 (1995) pp. 95-145  
3 Helen Wallace, “The changing politics of the European Union: an Overview”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies 39:4 (2001) pp. 581-594 
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name of the general interest. Nonetheless, the search for new forms and 
methodologies of integrative policy-making and rule-setting is progressing, even if 
through a narrow path of reform, which is not unlimited
4. In sum, the EU as a 
structure for integration has its own inertia and autonomy. 
 
The following section of the article will analyze the OMC as the best example of this 
painstaking process of internal reform of the EU model of integration. Then, the 
article will attempt to contextualize the origins and possible trajectory of the 
contemporary legal techniques within the EU, covering the whole range between 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ governance methods. Finally, the article will assess the current 
pragmatic mix of regulative strategies employed in the EU and will draw some 
possible scenarios for future developments. 
The Open Method of Coordination 
 
Since the 1980s a renewed dynamics of European integration has been linked 
to the emergence of new voluntarist methods of governance
5. Until the creation of the 
EU, with the Maastricht Treaty serving as a complex blueprint, this development 
eluded being transposed into the formal provisions of the Treaties. Since then, 
however, the intergovernmental method has been increasingly formalized alongside 
with the Community method.  
 
Helen Wallace argues that the EU is based upon a variety of modes of policy making, 
which vary from purely intergovernmental to entirely supranational. In consequence, 
decision-makers inside the EU have a spectrum of instruments at their disposal, 
ranging from supranational to intergovernmental. The latter instruments come in 
different forms and degrees of intensity. At one extreme, ‘intensive 
intergovernmentalism’, conceived outside the Community framework and shielded 
from the interference of supranational bodies, has an explicitly inter-state design. 
Compared with classic intergovernmental arrangements, it is characterized by the 
                                                 
4 James G. March, “Continuity and change in theories of organizational action”, Administrative 
Organization Quarterly 41:2 (1996) pp. 278-287 
5 Renaud Dehousse, “Integration v. Regulation? On the dynamics of regulation in the European 
Community”, Journal of Common Market Studies 30 (1992) pp. 383-402 
Wolfgang Streeck, “Neo-Voluntarism: A new European Social Policy Regime?”, in Gary Marks, Fritz 
Scharpf, Philippe Schmitter, Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), op. cit., pp. 64-94 
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emergence of dense and intense patterns of interaction, which involve stable networks 
of national ministers and officials
6. At the other extreme, ‘integration through 
multilateral surveillance’ is a policy methodology present in various international 
organizations, where socialization and learning processes among decision-makers are 
the main vehicles for changing domestic policies and politics.  
 
One good example of the second strategy of inter-governmental coordination is the 
OMC, formalized at the Lisbon European Council in 2004 and aimed at dealing with 
various policy areas linked to economic growth and adjustment of the welfare state. In 
fact, the OMC is the product of a long process, which was launched informally at the 
1997 Luxembourg Summit on the European Employment Strategy (EES) and 
developed over the years by the member states by way of experimentation with the 
traditional Community method
7. Specifically, the OMC departed from the Community 
method of decision-making by creating formalized procedures in which governmental 
performance is defined and assessed under broad peer-managed guidance, without 
sanctions. The OMC can be simply characterized as a special form of multilateral 
surveillance, which introduces non-enforceable voluntary obligations in the EU and 
does not differ in kind from the legal instruments used by other international 
organizations, such as the OECD
8.  
 
Whereas the Community method has traditionally been associated with the mandatory 
enactment of the Community law and recourse to judicial review, ‘intensive 
                                                 
6 The first reflection on this aspect of European integration was advanced in a seminal chapter by 
Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, “Conclusions: Community Politics and Institutional 
Change”, in William Wallace (ed.), The Dynamics of European Integration (London: Pinter, 1990) pp. 
276-300. Sociological implications of the intergovernmental integration in the European Union were 
analyzed by Knud Erik Jorgensen, “PoCo: The Diplomatic Republic of Europe”, in Knud Erik 
Jorgensen (ed), Reflective Approaches to European Governance (Macmillan, 1997) pp. 167-180 
This analysis at the regional level complements the more ambitious hypothesis of Anne-Marie 
Slaughter of a ‘New World order’ formed by networked interaction among liberal states at the global 
level. Slaughter looks at the proliferation of global networks, especially among government officials, 
including judges, legislators and bureaucrats, who exchange information and coordinate their activities 
across national borders in order to tackle transnational problems. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World 
Order (Princeton University Press, 2005) 
7 Mario Telo, “Governance and government in the European Union: The open method of coordination” 
in  
Maria Joao Rodrigues (ed), The New Knowledge Economy in Europe (Edward Elgar, 2002) p. 251 
8 Armin Schaefer, “A New and Effective Form of Governance? Comparing the OMC to Multilateral 
Surveillance by the IMF and the OECD”, Paper for the 2004 Conference of Europeanists, March 11-13 
2004, Chicago  
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intergovernmentalism’
9 and, more recently, the OMC are based on a different legal 
approach
10. The OMC produces guidelines agreed at the European level that are not 
binding and do not impose sanctions in case a government decides not to act. The 
invigilation of these guidelines is limited to peer review and public naming-and-
shaming. It is possible to distinguish between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ means of governance 
by using the binding versus non-binding character of legal techniques as a criterion of 
discrimination. The metaphor of the ‘hard’ character of the Community method refers 
to its legal output, which is based on adjudication and enforcement procedures. In 
comparison, legal practices, procedures and rules, which are produced by the OMC, 
are described as ‘soft’, because they lack rigidity and enforceability. 
 
From an intergovernmentalist point of view, the explanation for the development of 
the ‘hard’ legal approach is presence of a relative consensus amongst the member 
states on specific goals in certain policy areas, which leads them to accept the 
Community law as the standard legal practice. In areas where this consensus is not 
present, harmonization and legal sanctions are replaced by more compromising and 
subtler means of compliance. According to Joseph Weiler, however, the exceptional 
status of the Community law, or the ‘approfondissement’ of ‘normative 
supranationalism’ is countered by the emergence of ‘decisional 
intergovernmentalism’. Member states tolerated the construction of adventurous 
doctrines by the ECJ over the status of the Community law precisely because each 
member state retained a veto over the acts that would bear these legal characteristics. 
Moreover, such legal doctrines provided a guarantee of commitment of all the parties 
to these intergovernmental compromises.  
 
Joseph Weiler presents this phenomenon as the structural equation of the classical 
European constitutionalism, which was developed in the context of the Common 
Market
11. Here, the enforceability of normative supranationalism is tied together in a 
dynamic balance with decisional intergovernmentalism. In his view, the ‘hardness’ of 
the Community law is directly proportional to the willingness of governments to be 
                                                 
9 Michael Smith, ‘Diplomacy by Decree: The Legalization of EU Foreign Policy”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies 39 (2001) pp. 81-106 
10 Sabrina Regent, “The Open Method of Coordination: A New Supranational Form of Governance?”, 
European Law Journal 9:2 (2003) pp. 190-214 
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bound by it. Consequently, given the increasing resort to qualified majority voting in 
the decision-making process of the EU, member states are less willing to submit 
themselves to the rigidity implied by the traditional Community law. Thus, the 
character of new strategies and instruments employed within the EU can be explained 
by the fact that it is more difficult to achieve consensus amongst the member states. 
Moreover, the addition of the second and third pillars of policy-making has shielded 
certain policy areas from the judicial review of the ECJ or from the monopoly of 
initiative by the Commission. For these reasons, one can describe the current EU 




Since the Single European Act it has been possible to individuate a correlation 
between a policy area and legal instruments used
13. In fact, different legal techniques 
were conceived for different spheres of activity. New practical demands have 
triggered a change in response as well as process through which it was delivered. 
Whereas the Community method has been dealing prevalently with movements of 
goods and services, governed according to harmonized standards, the new methods of 
integration are mostly concerned with immaterial exchange of information and best 
practices. Thus, there has been a shift from an emphasis upon behavioral enforcement 
through negative restrictions towards creative construction of consensus for positive 
objectives.  
 
In this context, the OMC has become an object of intensive discussion and analysis, 
which aim at exploring practical implications of formalizing this methodology
14. 
Amongst other things, this debate helps to understand the prestige of traditional 
methods of European integration, backed by the Community law as a guarantor. In 
fact, the success of the past integration process is often presented as inherently 
dependent on formal characteristics of the EU institutions, arguably the only 
                                                                                                                                            
11 Joseph Weiler, “The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism”, Yearbook of 
European Law 1 (1981)  pp. 268-306 
12 Denis Curtis, “The constitutional structure of the Union: a Europe of bits and pieces”, Common 
Market Law Review 30 (1993) p. 17 
Jean-Claude Gautron, “Une Europe à droits variables”, Pouvoirs 69 (1994) pp. 77-93 
13 Renaud Dehousse, Joseph Weiler, “EPC and the Single Act: From Soft Law to Hard Law?”, in 
Martin Holland (ed), The Future of European Political Cooperation (Macmillan, 1991) p. 161 
14 Grainne de Burca, Jonathan Zeitlin, “Constitutionalizing the Open Method of Coordination: A Note 
to the Convention” CEPS Policy Briefs 31 (2003) 
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international organizations enacting binding rules. As a consequence, the introduction 
of the OMC and flexible enforcement of its rules seem to challenge this assumption, 
which is at the core of traditional understanding of the European integration process.  
 
For lawyers, the major controversy regarding the OMC resides in its challenge to the 
uniformity and integrity of the Community law, which are seen as structural 
guarantees of integration. On the contrary, the OMC is used as a platform for striking 
voluntary agreements rather than making laws. According to the purists of ‘orthodox’ 
integration, the OMC is enlarging strategic room of maneuver available to 
governments in choosing whether and to what degree to take European goals into 
account in their domestic policies. In their view, the main dynamics driving this new 
method is a renewed intergovernmental logic of European integration, characterized 
by lack of commitment and rhetorical effects
15. In other words, the OMC is viewed as 
a less supranational and less integrationist form of governance. The advocates of this 
new method, however, underline advantages presented by the characteristics 
associated with the OMC: flexibility, adaptability, and pervasiveness
16. Another 
argument is that preservation of diversity is particularly important in the fields where 
the OMC is used. Due to extensive differences among current member states, a 
straight-jacketed harmonization in certain areas would cause more damage than 
benefits
17.   
 
Despite contrasting views on desirability and effectiveness of the OMC
18, critics and 
advocates of this approach do agree on the inherent opposition between flexibility and 
‘softness’ of the legal features of the OMC and uniformity as well as rigidity of the 
Community law used as the ‘orthodox’ method of integration
19. This type of 
conceptualization, however, falls victim to excessive dualization of the two 
                                                 
15 Claudio Radaelli, “The Open Method of Coordination”, SIEPS Report 2003:1 
16 Maria-Joao Rodriguez, Mario Telo (eds), Vers une société européenne de la connaissance. La 
stratégie de Lisbonne 2000-2010, (Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2004) 
17 Fritz W. Scharpf, “The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenge of Diversity” MPIfG 
Working Paper 8 (2002) 
18 Introduction in Renaud Dehousse (ed.), L’Europe sans Bruxelles ? (Paris, L’Harmattan, 2004), pp. 
13-20 
19 Jacques Delors “Avant-Propos”, in Renaud Dehousse (ed.), L’Europe sans Bruxelles  ? (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 2004), pp. 9-10 
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methodologies of policy-making
20. In reality, the use of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ legal 
instruments in different areas of the EU is not so neatly segregated
21. On the contrary, 
because of the presence of a common institutional background and actions of common 
supranational organizations, such as the Commission and the ECJ, there is a 
widespread cross-fertilization amongst pillars, especially in terms of policy 
methodologies and legal approaches. This mutual hybridization has been contributing 
to the growth of a new pragmatic mix of regulative instruments, intrinsically linked to 
the present fluctuating state of European integration. The EU, in its current form, is 
the most important institutionalized forum on the European continent; thus it serves as 
a nesting ground for various integrative experiments among its member countries. 
Cross-fertilization and mutual exchange among these different integrative 
experiments result in a fragmented system that transcends a simplistic opposition of 
‘soft’ against ‘hard’ governance
22.  
 
This result is apparent, for instance, in the field of employment. In this policy area, 
where the OMC was first applied ante litteram as the European Employment 
Strategy
23, all possible legal means have been applied over time. The spectrum of 
measures have ranged from ‘hard’ Treaty dispositions on wage equality, regulations 
on safety and directives on health matters to ‘soft’ guidelines produced by the 
Luxembourg Summit, passing through self-regulation promoted by the Commission 
through the procedure of Social Dialogue between employers and employees. The 
chronological development of this process is extremely irregular on the ‘soft-hard’ 
axis. 
                                                 
20 Renaud Dehousse, “The Open Method of Coordination: a New Policy Paradigm?”, Cahiers 
européens de Sciences Po, 3 (2003) 
21 Imelda Maher, “Law and the Open Method of Coordination: Towards a new Flexibility in European 
Policy-Making?” , Journal for Comparative Government and European Policy 2:2 (2004) pp. 248-262 
22 Philippe Pochet, “European Employment Strategies and Open Method of Coordination: Mixed 
Results and Multiple Challenges”, in Edward Best, Danielle Bossaert (eds.), From Luxembourg to 
Lisbon and Beyond (EIPA, 2002) pp. 31-47 
23 Janine Goetschy, “Les nouveaux éléments sur l’emploi et le social: rattrappage, consolidation ou 
percée” in Mario Telo, Paul Magnette (eds.), De Maastricht à Amsterdam (Editions Complexes, 1998) 
pp. 139-162  

















































































































































































































In sum, this part of the article attempted to place the OMC in the context of general 
parameters of European integration while adopting a long-term perspective in respect 
of the patterns of evolution in the EU governance. It was argued that such 
conceptualization allows for different analysis of the debate concerning the OMC. 
The next part of the article applies the same method to the analysis of the 
phenomenon of ‘soft’ law, generally perceived as ‘the’ legal technique associated 
with the OMC. 
Soft Law in Context 
 
This section of the article attempts to present origins (a) and possible 
directions (b) of ‘soft’ law in the context of the legal style of EU regulation, paying 
particular attention to research carried out on the OMC and its application in the field 
of social policy. Before discussing these issues, however, the article will point out 
some preliminary clarifications. First, the article will argue that the transformation of 
EU legal technique towards ‘soft’ regulation under conditions of intergovernmental 
bargaining cannot be explained by a simple paradigmatic shift, either pragmatic or 
ideological. Secondly, the article will point out why the supranational machinery of 
the EU is not irremediably incompatible with the introduction of new modes of 
regulation. 
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The shift to new forms of regulation at the European level can be linked to broader 
trends of legal style in the context of modern administrative practices. One possible 
interpretation is that we are experiencing a consistent and progressive substitution of 
‘hard’ forms of regulations with ‘soft’ ones across different policy areas
24. This 
hypothesis indicates a gradual shift from authoritative to indicative regulation in 
modern administrative practices
25. At the national level administrative and public law 
have shifted from the traditional top-down regulatory approach towards a greater 
recognition of the virtue of informal standards and negotiation. Moreover, the 
shortcomings of hierarchical and detailed regulation are magnified by the ideological 
turn against command-and-control approaches. The latter are viewed as suppressing 
individual freedom and interfering with the complex dynamics of market allocation.   
 
Accordingly, the adoption of ‘soft’ law in the EU is deemed to be part of this new 
regulatory paradigm, which places more emphasis on informal norm-setting. The 
underlying claim is that the legal style of the EU is moving away from traditional, 
top-down, control-and-command forms, typical of the European Communities. This 
trend is well documented in traditional areas, such as market regulation
26, and in 
newer ones, such as environment
27. In older policy areas, the integration process 
reached a stage where all possible formal integration has been obtained, thus 
additional results can be achieved only under informal procedures. In newer policy 
areas, harmonization as an approach is often not even considered, because it is not 
desirable or politically feasible
28. Yet, some action towards policy consistency has to 
be taken in order to address the existing problems. Chalmers and Lodge capture this 
trend:  
 
“No longer is the European Union to be centered around the Classical 
Community Method of supranational management of regulation. Instead it is 
to be a decentered participatory process in which national governments are no 
                                                 
24 François Chazel, Jacques Commaille (eds), Normes juridiques et regulation sociale (LGDJ, 1991) 
25 Charles-Albert Morand, Le droit neo-moderne des politiques publiques (LDGJ, 1999) 
26 Burkhard Eberlein, “Formal and Informal Cooperation in Single Market Regulation”, in Thomas 
Christiansen, Silvia Piattoni (eds.), Informal Governance in the EU (Edward Elgar, 2003)  
27 Jonathan Golub (ed), New Instruments for Environmental Policy in the EU (Routledge, 1998) 
28 Andrea Lenschow, “New Regulatory Approaches in ‘Greening’ EU policies”, in European Law 
Journal 8:1 (2002) pp. 19-37  
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longer controlled and commanded by the imperatives of EC law…and new 
types of Union-member State relations are forged which are centered less 
around classical legal prescriptions, and more around diffuse adaptation to a 
wide array of transnational norms, whose form and origin varies.”
29
 
In spite of the clarity and thrust of this argument, there are major problems concerning 
such a simplistic explanation concerning paradigmatic shift towards a generalized 
‘soft’ approach. This view fails to point out that ‘soft’ law can prosper also because of 
the success of ‘hard’ law. On the one hand, some of the legitimacy for the use of ‘soft’ 
law derives in part from the established patterns of the ‘hard’ Community law. The 
historical legacy of European integration, achieved through the use of ‘hard’ 
sanctions, is not put into question by the search for new instruments for future 
integration. On the other hand, there is empirical evidence against the hypothesis of a 
progressive fading of traditional legal arrangements, backed by sanction-oriented 
remedies. For a start, the current use of ‘soft’ law by the Commission is not 
threatening the acquis of the internal market. In other words, the use of ‘soft’ law is 
not detracting from the validity of the traditional paradigm of law, at least in the 
context of the first pillar
30.  
 
In reality, the emergence of ‘soft’ law is not a sign of the progressive erosion of its 
‘hard’ version. The rise of ‘soft’ law around new modes of governance is a fact, but 
up to this date European integration remains based to a large extent on ‘hard’ law 
enacted through the Community method. Moreover, the proliferation of ‘soft’ law 
does not preclude these new legal forms progressing towards a subsequent phase, 
which is based on coupling of obligations and sanctions. For instance, the area of 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), which has been associated with ‘soft’ law and 
flexible rules of cooperation since its onset
31, has experienced a shift in the mid-1990s 
towards ‘harder’ forms of legislation and a progressive, if imperfect, incorporation 
                                                 
29 Damian Chalmers and Martin Lodge, “The Open Method of Co-ordination and the European Welfare 
State”, Discussion paper, ESCR Center for Analysis of Risk and Regulation (11 June 2003) p. 1 
30 Geraint Howells, “Soft Law in EC consumer law”, in Paul Craig, Carol Harlow, Lawmaking in the 
European Union (Kluwer Law International, 1998) pp. 310-331 
31 Elspeth Guild, “The Constitutional Consequences of lawmaking in the third pillar” in Paul Craig, 
Carol Harlow, Lawmaking in the European Union (Kluwer Law International, 1998) pp. 65-88 
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under the scope of the Community law and the interpretation of the ECJ
32. Even in the 
sphere of security and defense cooperation, the long-term experience is that of a 
progressive ‘hardening’ of the otherwise flexible dispositions dealing with highly 
discretional and sensitive issues
33. Finally, prototypes of informal coordination similar 




Another point of clarification concerns the supposedly unconditional opposition of the 
EU supranational bodies to ‘soft’ law agreements, and especially the OMC. Along the 
axis of uniformity/flexibility, European supranational organizations have tended to 
operate close to the uniformity pole. However, it is possible to notice a growing shift 
from this traditional way of functioning. The Commission in particular derogated 
more freely from the tenets of uniformity and enforceability of the Community law, to 
which the ECJ is tied in virtue of its own constitution
35. This freedom of maneuver 
has been exploited without always acknowledging it, most often in order to achieve 
concrete results while keeping the appearances. For instance, with the adoption of the 
principle of subsidiarity, the design of directives changed. Member states were given 
increasingly larger room of maneuver for transposing the content of directives, while 
the criteria for judging their conformity with the common principles have become less 
stringent
36. Conversely, the ECJ took note of this move towards less than perfect 




The emergence of ‘soft’ law inside the Union is not limited to the OMC and policy 
areas in which the OMC has already been deployed. In fact, it has influenced the 
wider context of the activities of European integration. As a consequence, the 
                                                 
32 Jorg Monar, “Institutionalizing Freedom, Security, Justice”, in John Peterson, Michael Shackleton, 
The Institutions of the European Union  (Oxford University Press, 2002) pp. 186-209 
33 Renaud Dehousse, Joseph Weiler, “EPC and the Single Act: From Soft Law to Hard Law?”, in 
Martin Holland (ed), The Future of European Political Cooperation (Macmillan, 1991) p. 161 
34 David Hodson, Imelda Maher, “The Open Method of Coordination as a New Mode of Governance. 
The Case of Soft Economic Policy Coordination”, Journal of Common Market Studies 39:4 (2001) p. 
16 
35 “The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is 
observed” Art. 164 EC Treaty 
36 Brendan Flynn, “Subsidiarity and the rise of ‘soft’ law in EU environmental policy: beyond who 
does what, to what it is they actually do?”, Occasional Papers 40, University College Dublin (1997) 
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departure from the formal rule-making, uniform interpretation, and top-down 
enforcement of enacted rules has already happened not only within the realms 
regulated by the Community method, but also in areas covered by intergovernmental 
logic. ‘Soft’ law can be considered as an evolving concept, as it is neither confined to 
specific areas nor has precise boundaries in the context of the EU
38.  
 
As such, ‘soft’ law can be used in ambivalent ways: either to avoid stronger 
integration or to promote it. The legal arsenal of the Commission has always included 
both ‘softer’ legal instruments and tools whose legal effect is constraining. Less 
formal instruments, such as recommendations, resolutions and codes of conduct, have 
grown and prospered alongside with rigid regulations, directives and decisions, which 
have a clear ‘hard law’ aura. Moreover, the use of ‘hard’ instruments did not, in spite 
of their formal binding effects, ensure prompt and effective implementation of the 
Community law
39. Due to resistance to the harmonization approach, the Commission 
converted itself to the virtue of ‘soft’ law in the early 1980s by introducing self-
regulation and voluntary standardization
40. The Commission has customarily used 
other rule-making procedures than the Community method in order to overcome 
rigidities of the traditional decision-making process. These steps were primarily 
motivated by the search for flexibility. Moreover, guidelines
41 and communications
42 
have been used by the Commission to colonize and incorporate fields outside ‘hard’ 
Community law, often with the collaboration of the ECJ.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
37 David Grimeaud, “The EC Water Framework Directive – An instrument for integrating Water 
Policy”, Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 13:1 (2004) pp. 27-39 
38 For a review of the problems of this concept in Community law see K. C. Wellens and G. M. 
Borchardt, “Soft Law in European Community Law” European Law Review 14 (1989) pp. 267-321. pp. 
296-302. They also provide classification of Community’s soft law according to forum, form and 
content. 
39 Alberto Gil Ibanez, “The Administration, Supervision and Enforcement of EC Law: Powers, 
Procedures and Limits” European Law Review (2000) p. 211-235 
Giuseppe Azzi Ciavarrini, “The Slow March of European Legislation: the Implementation of 
Directives” in Karlheinz Neunreither and Antje Wiener, (eds.), European Integration after Amsterdam: 
Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy, (Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 52-67 
40 Michelle Egan, Constructing an European Market (Oxford University Press, 2001) 
41 Michelle Cini, “The soft law approach: Commission rule-making in the EU’s state aid regime”, 
Journal of European Public Policy 8:2 (2001) pp. 192-207 
42 Anne-Marie Tournepiche, “Les communications : instruments privilegiés de l’action administrative 
de la Commission européenne”, Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne 454 (2002) pp. 
55-62 
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Therefore, in the process of European integration, broad headings of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
law are not coterminous with supranational and/or intergovernmental character of 
European politics. A more detailed analysis reveals contradictory and complex 
evolution of the use and practice of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law
43. As mentioned earlier, this 










































The following sections of the article will provide further explanation concerning the 
emergence of ‘soft’ law (a) and its evolution in the EU context (b). The main 
hypothesis is that if a diversity of legal arrangements is a result of intergovernmental 
bargain, institutional context in which ‘soft’ law is introduced should be geared 
towards transformation from ‘soft’ to ‘hard’ law. This evolution is due to three 
elements: path-dependent trajectory of regulation, presence of organizations 
committed to such patterns, and normative expectations created by the EU 
institutional environment. The expectations of actors, shaped by institutional 
environment, are particularly important in the absence of material incentives or 
sanctions related to non-compliance with the rules. 
                                                 
43 Joanne Scott, David Trubek, “Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the 
European Union”, European Law Journal 8:1 (2002) pp.  1-18 
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a) The emergence of soft law 
  
Since the 1970s
44, legal and political scholars alike have been interested in the 
so-called ‘legalization of international politics’, that is proliferation of international 
law and activism of international organizations
45. The growing importance of 
international organizations has had substantial impact on the increasing formalization 
of practices and legalization of behavior in international governance.  
 
Because of its perceived uniqueness, the EU legal system is often analyzed with the 
help of a specific normative model
46. Scholars of regional studies often argue that 
European integration is a unique phenomenon, limited to Western Europe
47, thus it 
requires particular patterns of explanation
48. Their main argument is that this regional 
phenomenon is the product of a very specific conjuncture in historical and political 
terms. As a consequence, it needs to be considered in isolation from external trends 
and situations. Specifically, the characteristics of the EU law are perceived to be 
direct derivatives from the characteristics of the Community law present in the first 
pillar. A less dogmatic definition of the European law is needed so that a simple resort 
to sui generis argument would not be used to resolve contradictions of the EU legal 
system.  
 
This article argues that some interesting insights can be brought from outside such an 
EU-centric perspective. The introduction of the OMC has polemically been presented 
as an irruption of international law inside the realm of European integration. 
Following this approach, it is important to understand how ‘soft’ law originated in the 
international realm, as a legal concept and a political practice. According to the 
                                                 
44 Christine Chinkin, "The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law," 
(1989) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38 (1989) p. 850; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “Soft 
Law and the International Law of the Environment”, Michigan Journal of International Law 12 (1991) 
p. 420; Alan E. Boyle, “Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law”, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 48 (1999) p. 901 
References cited in Jutta Brunnée, Stephen J. Toope, “Persuasion and Enforcement: Explaining 
Compliance with International Law”, Finnish Yearbook of International Law (2002) pp. 273-295  
45 Kenneth Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Duncan Snidal, 
“The Concept of Legalization”, International Organization 54:3 (2000) pp. 401-419 
46 Kamiel Mortelmans, “Community Law: more than a functional area of law, less than a legal system”, 
Legal issues of European Integration (1996) pp. 23-49 
47 William Wallace, Regional Integration: the West European Experience (Brookings Institution, 1994) 
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authoritative analysis made by Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, legal instruments 
available to states vary alongside three different dimensions running from a ‘hard’ to a 
‘soft’ pole: precision of the rules, gradation of the obligation, and form of delegation 
to a third party for adjudication and enforcement. Accordingly, ‘hard’ law is a 
strongly institutionalized instrument at the disposal of international actors, which is 
aimed at solving political problems. The two authors, however, add that ‘hard’ law 
introduces non-state actors in interstate relations. They come in the form of agents 
with delegated authority in pursuit of principals’ interests:  
 
“The term hard law…refers to legally binding obligations that are precise (or 
can be made precise through adjudication or the issuance of detailed 
regulations) and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the 
law. Although hard law is not the typical international legal arrangements, a 
close look at this institutional form provides a baseline for understanding the 
benefits and costs of all types of legalization. By using hard law to order their 
relations, international actors reduce transactions costs, strengthen the 
credibility of their commitments expand their available political strategies, and 
resolve problems of incomplete contracting. Doing so, however, also entails 




In their perspective, differences between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ legalized arrangements are 
a matter of degree. The ‘continuum argument’ provides a useful analytical grid, which 
can easily be operationalized to study specific rules and norms pertinent to an issue 
area. Generally, all international rules and legal orders involving inter-state 
cooperation could be analyzed in one reference system, using three dimensions. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
48 Robert O. Keohane, Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), The New European Community: Decision-making and 
institutional change (Westview, 1991) 
49 Kenneth Abbott, Duncan Snidal, “Hard and Soft law in International Governance”, International 
Organization 54:3 (2000) pp. 421-422 







Fig. 1 – Three dimensions of reference 
  
 
Such referential system can be especially useful in the context of the EU, because EU 
law covers all possible hues and nuances of the legal spectrum, spreading from the 
Community law, in its various forms, to EU law ranging from Treaties to gentlemen’s 
agreements.  
 
The continuum argument is convenient for analytical purposes, but it also exhibits 
serious problems
50. Firstly, the politics of choosing legal instruments is assumed to 
follow a rationalist functional logic. The use of a particular kind of rules is perceived 
to be dependent on the goals to be achieved. The consequent conceptualization of law 
is deeply instrumentalist and thus is conducive to the view of law as a tool in the 
hands of its users
51. Consequently, the symbolic power of the resort to law is 
neglected and, by the same token, the higher legitimacy of ‘hard’ law in respect of 
‘soft’ law is not considered as a relevant dimension of the equation
52. Nonetheless, the 
rule of law, subjected or not to the control of a judicial body, is considered to be a 
value in itself. The EU defines itself specifically as a ‘Community of Law’. This 
definition implies a reference to a certain identity and values, thus respect for the rule 
of law is a specific criterion for any state seeking accession to this club. 
                                                 
50 For general criticisms, see Martha Finnemore, Stephen J. Toope, “Alternatives to 'Legalization': 
Richer Views of Law and Politics”, International Organization 55:3  (2001) pp.743-758 
51 Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Introduction: 
Legalization and World Politics” International Organization 54:3 (2000) p. 391 
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Secondly, such a referential system fails to answer the basic question of what law is 
and which criteria characterize it in respect of non-law. Once the absolute boundary 
between legal norms and other rules is abandoned by adopting a continuum 
conceptualization, the only possible distinction among degrees is based on relative 
criteria. Abbott and Snidal solve this problem by assuming that one of the poles of the 
spectrum is approximating law-like features. In this way, ‘hard legalization’ is taken 
as the essential model of legal arrangement, to which ‘soft’ law relates as a shadow. 
Whereas ‘hard’ law, characterized by precise and binding obligations as well as 
delegation to third parties for enforcement, resonates with the traditional image of 
domestic law, ‘soft’ law dwells in the realm of political promises. In other words, the 
‘lawness’ of international ‘hard’ law is based on the projection of the image of 
domestic law onto the international level. However, if one pole of the continuum is 
firmly anchored in the analogy with domestic law, the other end of the spectrum is not 
so well defined. As a consequence, ‘soft’ law can be confused in this scheme with any 
rule that is not backed by external force. As intrinsic characteristics of law as such are 
not defined, it is impossible to grasp the specific normative value of legal rules in 
respect of non-legal ones.  
 
Political scientist are often accused of entering the legal field without due 
consideration of the nature of law. But even legal scholars, who have the benefit of 
centuries-old disciplinary tradition, have not completely settled the problem of 
differentiating between law and other normative systems
53. So far, the positivist 
distinction between law and non-law, based on the existence of force backing for the 
application of rules, is the default solution. It is not, however, completely satisfactory 
for several reasons. For instance, following such a definition, categorization of rules 
as international law and the Community law is elusive
54. Moreover, even in the 
domestic arena, the needs of the welfare state have created ambiguous legal 
                                                                                                                                            
52 Renaud Dehousse, Joseph H. H. Weiler, “Legal Dimension of European Integration” in William 
Wallace, The Dynamics of European Integration (Pinter, 1990) pp. 242-260 
53 See the famous debate between Lon Fuller and Herbert Hart in Harvard Law Review. 
54 Michael Zurn, Dieter Wolf, “European Law and International Regimes: the features of law beyond 
the nation”, European Law Journal 5:3 (1999) pp. 272-292 
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These objections have to be considered seriously before applying the ‘continuum 
argument’ to the EU legal arrangements. A different understanding of ‘lawness’ is 
needed to overcome weaknesses of the positivist lenses adopted in legalization 
studies. A possible alternative is to take into account thick sociological and 
institutional layers that give a contextual meaning to the use of law, ‘hard’ or ‘soft’. 
The intrinsic quality of law is connected to the context in which the creation of norms 
takes place. Accordingly, law can be appreciated as the product of a joint enterprise of 
regulation, produced by interaction amongst different actors and organizations. Its 
results are determined at different paces and degrees: 
 
“First, law should be viewed as a creative activity…formed through 
continuing struggles of social practices...This leads to a second implication, 




Following this view, law is an artificial construct evolving through social practice
57. 
Due to constant interaction, however, relatively stable patterns of expectations emerge 
to allow the application of norms in specific contexts. The assumption here is that 
compliance with legal rules is functioning on a persuasive, and not coercive, basis. 
Only legal systems that are congruent with the practices and expectations of their 
context of application can be perceived as legitimate and promoting compliance. Such 
a view is compatible with an historical institutionalist account of the evolution of the 
phenomenon of ‘soft’ law in the context of the EU, as it helps to explain how ‘soft 
law’ manages to transcend the intergovernmental dynamics of its origins. 
                                                 
55 Daniel Mockle, “Gouverner sans Droit”, Les Cahiers de Droit 43:2 (2002) pp. 143-211 
56 Jutta Brunnée, Stephen J. Toope, “International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an 
Interactional Theory of International Law”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 39 (2000) pp.46-
47 
For a short overview, see Jutta Brunnée, Stephen J. Toope, “Interactional International Law”, 
International Legal Forum droit international 3:3 (2002) pp. 186-192 
57 Jutta Brunnée, Stephen J. Toope, “Persuasion and Enforcement: Explaining Compliance with 
International Law”, Finnish Yearbook of International Law (2002) p. 278 
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b) The evolution towards hard law 
 
In theory, as demonstrated in previous sections, the boundary between ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ legal rules is unclear. In practice, the analytical distinction between formal 
and informal rules also does not seem to imply a threshold too difficult to cross. Once 
it is passed, however, it is difficult to reverse the course of action. In fact, the 
evolution of ‘soft’ law is subject to an independent course, notwithstanding its 
original intention. As a consequence, European actors encounter the unexpected and 
unintended dynamics of institutionalization at the European level. In the short term, 
the use of ‘soft’ instruments can be favored over other forms of regulation due to 
uncertainties linked to intractable or fluid conditions that do not allow for the 
definition of rigid forms of regulation. In the long run, however, the net effect of the 
adoption of ‘soft’ law leads to facilitating the adoption and acceptance of ‘hard’ law. 
The use of ‘soft’ law is facilitating the passage to more precise, clear and enforceable 
norms, because repeated interactions and conflicts under informal rules are pushing 
towards a higher degree of institutionalization of these rules
58. Moreover, ‘hard’ law 
seems to enjoy more legitimacy in respect of ‘soft’ law, at least in the eyes of the 
European elites. This additional factor can push more easily ‘soft’ law towards further 
institutionalization, especially once it entered the process of being formalized. 
 
The resulting pattern is the use of ‘soft’ law in the context of the EU legal order as 
part of a slippery slope towards ‘hard’ law. In such a scenario, the emergence of ‘soft’ 
law can be a first step, necessary but not sufficient, towards the crystallization of 
‘harder’ forms of regulation, which are equipped with binding effect and deemed to 
be more legitimate and ultimately more efficient. As a consequence, because of its 
apparently innocuous constraints and incentives for benign cooperation, ‘soft’ law 
could be an attractive solution for member states. Due to contextual features, 
however, the unintended consequences of its use are subtler than its apparent vices 
and virtues. In other words, the OMC based on ‘soft’ law is a choice made by member 
                                                 
58 Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz, “Institutionalizing the Treaty of Rome” in Alec Stone Sweet, 
Wayne Sandholtz, Neil Fligstein (eds.), The Institutionalization of Europe (Oxford University Press, 
2001) 
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states for a range of short-term reasons
59. At the same time, however, the adoption of 
‘soft’ law puts in motion a process that is not entirely under their control due to the 
environmental complexity in which it evolves. The OMC is used in areas where the 
EU, according to the division of formal competences, has none or little competence to 
act. In such a situation, the OMC may or may not be the best available approach to 
rule-making, but it is the only way in which EU standards can penetrate in a reserved 
national field. In the most favorable scenario, elites can be socialized and 
opportunities can be built for further intervention of supranational bodies and 
consequently for the emergence of ‘hard’ law. In the latter case, the OMC can even 
pave the way to spreading European rules in new fields. 
 
The argument for such an evolution is based on three factors: the specific EU 
institutional context, legal mechanisms in place, and the set of values and norms 
inside the EU. Firstly, the EU ‘soft’ law is operating in a legal constitutional 
framework. Detailed and precise legal rules define the framework in which all parties 
are embedded. The coexistence of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ legal styles is maintained under a 
single institutional umbrella, which is provided by the legal arrangements of the 
Treaties and go beyond the subdivision of areas into intergovernmental and 
supranational. Secondly, even in the case of consented targets where obligations of 
third parties are based primarily on voluntary performance, law plays a distinctive 
role. Traditional emphasis on legal norms and the presence of institutionalized rule-
making inevitably casts a shadow on the use of EU ‘softer’ instruments. Even when 
‘hard’ law is not employed, it enters in the picture by virtue of its existence and 
provides some parameters of reference. Finally, the presence of the ECJ and the 
Commission as autonomous and authoritative bodies inside the EU calls into question 
the maintenance of their fuzzy status inside the present legal order of the EU. This 
view is confirmed by the reactions of these supranational bodies towards the 
proliferation of ‘soft’ law within the Community law. 
 
                                                 
59 Different reasons can be listed: avoiding principal-agent dynamics, minimizing costs of exit from the 
agreement, shifting blame for national decisions to the European level, performing symbolic politics 
and increasing flexibility. 
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In its White Paper on Governance of 2001, the Commission accepted the need for 
flexibility and the use of non-legislative and non-constraining instruments
60. 
Concerning the nature of legal mechanisms to be used, however, the Commission 
favored only such ‘soft’ legal instruments that are already under its control: 
framework directives, regulatory standards, and voluntary codes of conduct. The 
approach of the White paper towards the emergence of the OMC was mainly 
defensive: it focused on the shortcomings of this method and the perceived 
incompatibility of the Community method with the OMC
61. In direct opposition to the 
enthusiasm of the European Council towards dissemination of the OMC, the 
Commission showed strong reservations and reacted negatively to the possibility that 
its role in initiating and implementing legislation could be undermined or eroded. In 
fact, the OMC processes leave each member state to set its own objectives and decide 
its own pace in attaining them. The most important OMC coordination forum at the 
EU level is the European Council in its spring meeting
62. Despite the fact that the 
Commission plays a growing role in coordinating and steering the system, the 
inclusive and bottom-up approach of the OMC dilutes the role of the Commission.  
 
The ECJ is equally involved in tackling challenges, which are presented to the 
Community law by the proliferation of ‘soft’ law. Even according to formalist 
understanding, ‘soft’ law comprises every category of act that, though identified as 
not binding, is capable under certain circumstances of having legal effect. According 
to the accepted standards of ECJ judicial practice
63, ‘soft’ law is not enforceable in 
courts and is not generating rights and obligations in judicial proceedings, but it can 
have legal impact on the proceedings in front of courts as supplementary help to the 
interpretation of ‘hard’ law. In such a way, atypical instruments are a potential source 
of law, although in a subordinate position. Accordingly, the ECJ has already engaged 
with ‘soft’ law, albeit in a selective and hardly systematic manner
64. For a start, the 
ECJ has pragmatically recognized the shift towards differentiated regulation and has 
eschewed a strict construction of the objectives of framework directives. Conversely, 
                                                 
60 Commission, European Governance: a white paper, COM (2001) 428, Brussels 25 July, p. 4 
61 Idem, p. 28 
62 Council of the European Union, 2004 Spring European Council, 7631/04 Brussels, March 23, 2004 
63 Francis Snyder, “Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community” in Stephen 
Martin, The Construction of Europe. Essays in Honour of Emile Noël (Kluwer, 1994) pp. 197-225 
64 Jan Klabbers, “Informal Instruments before the European Court of Justice”, Common Market Law 
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given the fact that an increasing number of fuzzy legal instruments have been 
appearing in its forum, the Court has adopted a case-by-case approach, interpreting 
the relevant provisions for the purposes of a case at hand
65.  
 
Therefore, insofar as the traditional values and routines continue to be valid inside the 
EU, collective preferences are likely to favor legal approaches that maintain some 
degree of Union-wide uniformity. Moreover, European elites share a common 
normative background, namely the commitment of governments to formal norms and 
procedural rules as a strategy for conflict prevention and, eventually, solution.  
 
Since the end of WWII, Western European elites developed a seemingly startling 
“cult of the rules”, placing emphasis on the limitation of absolute sovereignty through 
legal means, especially international law
66. As a consequence, at the root of all policy 
methodologies applied during the history of European integration, there is a common 
emphasis on rules as the underlying instrument for promotion of integration. It was 
first applied within the intergovernmental framework of the Council of Europe, which 
proved to be a powerhouse for international treaties and legal conventions that 
covered progressively all its members
67. Subsequently, the emphasis on the necessary 
legal framework was retained in the supranational European Community of Steal and 
Coal (ECSC). Jean Monnet in his address to the ECSC Assembly in 1952 noted: “the 
union of Europe cannot be based on goodwill alone: rules are needed”
68. Finally, the 
European Communities, as a subset of Western Europe, developed a particularly 
strong conception of the need of legal rules, consistent with closer integration. Walter 
Hallstein, as the first President of the Commission, underlined the importance of the 
                                                 
65 Historically, this has been the case for resolutions (ECJ, Case 32/79 Commission v. United Kingdom 
[1980] E.C.R. 2403, para. 11), communications (ECJ, Case C-325/91 France v. Commission [1993] 
E.C.R. I-3283, para. 14-30; ECJ, Case C-57/95 France v. Commission [1997] E.C.R. I-1627), a code of 
conduct (ECJ, Case C-303/90 France v. Commission [1991] E.C.R. I-5315, para. 15-35) and 
conclusions of the Council (ECJ, Case 22/70, Commission v. Council [1971] E.C.R. 263, para. 53), 
which were qualified as binding acts whose legality in respect of the Treaties could be checked by the 
judges. 
66 Renaud Dehousse, “Conclusion : du bon usage de la méthode ouverte de coordination”, in Renaud 
Dehousse (ed), L’Europe sans Bruxelles ? (L’Harmattan, 2004), pp. 157-180 
67 Renaud Dehousse, “Un Nouveau Constitutionnalisme”, in Renaud Dehousse (ed), Une Constitution 
pour l’Europe? (Presses de Science Po, 2002) pp. 19-38  
68 Assemblée commune CECA, session d’ouverture, 4e séance, 11 September 1952, p. 41 
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legal framework for the existence of the European Economic Community (EEC), 
which “is a creation of the law, it is a source of law; and it is a legal system”
69.  
 
Thus, in spite of diverse modalities concerning policy formulation and 
implementation, European integration has been marked by an underlying emphasis on 
the creation of rules for the advancement of the process. This emphasis is still present 
at the EU level, as a principled course of action pervading the process of European 
integration. The common thread unifying ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of regulation is the 
strategy of integration through rules, above disagreement on their substantive content 
and beyond localized resistance to their specific application. 
 
This ideological confidence in the power of rules and especially legal norms as an 
integrative instrument has been tested in practice. To a certain extent, this was 
accomplished by the interpretative action of the ECJ, which ‘hardened’ the rather 
flexible nature of the Community law from its international origins towards a more 
rigid texture, coupled with the attributes of ‘hard’ legality. Legitimation of this 
transformation relied upon a sui generis argument, building on the unprecedented 
nature of the Community experiment. This experimental project, however, was 
modeled on the familiar characteristics of domestic law. In fact, the assumptions on 
which the Community law was built by the Court resonated with Kelsenian ideas of a 
complete legal order: a unitary source of ultimate authority, a hierarchical ordering of 
multiple legal orders, and a uniform and centralized interpretation of law provided by 
judicial structures
70. By using this blueprint, the ECJ developed the features of the 
Community law: direct effect, supremacy, pre-emption, uniform interpretation, and 
effet utile.  
 
The dynamics towards formalization and legalization of politics of the European 
integration process, which is led by the ECJ  according to its specific understanding of 
the nature of these rules, continues to have positive and negative consequences for the 
process of integration as a whole. On the one hand, the success of integration pursued 
through the Community method can be viewed as a result of its legalist style. The 
                                                 
69 Walter Hallstein, Europe in the Making (George Allen & Unwin, 1972) p. 33 
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Community law is full of legal concepts created by the jurisprudence of the ECJ in 
order to deal with a diverse and complex set of concrete problems arising at the 
national legal level
71. In addition to this, the categories of Community law are a 
conveniently neutral jargon for the culturally heterogeneous fonctionnaires at the 
European level
72. The remarkable success of transnational integration under such a 
legal aegis has reinforced among national legal elites the authority of the ECJ and 
belief in the virtues of its action. On the other hand, emphasis on legal categories and 
reasoning hinders political aspects. Contentious matters are often reduced to technical 
points of law and practical problems are exorcised with formalist solutions. 
Conversely, when issues are framed in political terms, the process of decision-making 
can be easily stalled and the solution becomes awkward
73. Moreover, the Community 
law is biased in favor of further integration. The early judicial doctrine and academic 
writings on the Community law, which over the years had shaped an influential 
jurisprudence
74, were produced by a cohesive interpretative community of scholars 
committed to further integration. 
 
To sum up, the use of ‘hard’ law at the service of integration has been, for better or 
worse, an enduring feature of the process of European integration. It is largely due to 
the context, actors and culture of the EU. These factors will also certainly cast a long 
shadow over its future development. In that respect, the situation inside the EU is very 
different from circumstances in which ‘soft’ law operates in the wider international 
realm. 
 
The use and impact of ‘soft’ law depend on the normative and organizational 
conditions in which it operates. Accordingly, the legal status of ‘soft’ law in the 
international sphere has more to do with the context in which it has been deployed 
than with its intrinsic characteristics. In fact, the absence of a clear hierarchy of 
                                                                                                                                            
70 Constantinos N. Kakouris, "La relation de l’ordre juridique communautaire avec les ordres juridiques 
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71 Josse Mertens de Wilmars, “La jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice comme instrument de 
l’intégration communautaire”, Cahiers de droit européen 1 (1976) pp. 135-148 
72 Chris Shore, Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration, (Routledge, 2000), 
2000 
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norms, the rarity of judicial settlement of disputes and the conflation of legal and 
political considerations are inherent to the nature of international ‘soft’ law. 
Therefore, one can argue that different contextual conditions of the EU can be 
favorable to an alternative path of development of ‘soft’ law within the EU.  
 
A pragmatic mix   
 
The emergence and evolution of ‘soft’ law inside the EU is a major symptom 
of the on-going process of transformation of the Community law and related decision-
making practices. On the one hand, the growing use of ‘soft’ law in a bewilderingly 
wide set of policy areas is following the desires and preferences of the member states 
that wish to enact guidelines of coordination of their behavior and at the same time 
preserve their freedom of action for themselves. On the other hand, the evolution of 
these instruments is influenced by their coexistence with the traditional Community 
law. New instruments emerge under the shadow of old arrangements, which 
subsequently influence their evolution. As a result of these conflicting trends, the EU 
normative environment, which is shaped by the interests of the member states but 
operating according to its own autonomous logic, is in a flux.  
 
According to Knill and Lenschow, modes of regulation that are currently available to 
the EU member states can be displayed alongside two axes: obligation and discretion. 
Each of these modes of regulation has its own advantages and disadvantages as well 
as different mechanisms underlying its implementation
75. 
 




HIGH Regulation  Framework  Directive 
LOW  Voluntary Code of Conduct  Open Method Coordination 
 
                                                 
75 See Christoph Knill, Andrea Lenschow, “Modes of Regulation in the Governance of the European 
Union: Towards a Comprehensive Evaluation”, European Integration online Papers 7 (2003) 
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Several possible scenarios concerning the future cohabitation of these different legal 
techniques in the EU could be presented. One possible scenario refers to the 
incompatibility of ‘soft’ law with ‘hard’ law, or at least to their irreducibility. 
Consequently, such reasoning leads to an eminently teleological view, which portrays 
an evolutionary path to an expected end-state of the EU integration, characterized by 
the predominance of a specific legal style. The precedent scenario does not capture 
the possibility of a fluid coexistence of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of law in the EU. 
However, this is the state of legal affairs in a growing number of areas where both the 
older Community method and the newer OMC are operating alongside each other, for 
instance, in the field of social policy. Statistical analysis of the types of instruments 
used in this policy field show that the use of one legal style is not phasing out the 
other. For instance, statistical analysis of the types of instruments used in the field of 
social policy shows that the use of one legal style is not phasing out the other, but that 
they are rather both growing in strength and presumably interacting
76.  
 
Thus, it is not possible to substantiate the claim that the emergence of new modes of 
policy-making and non-traditional rule-making, such as the OMC, has replaced or 
reduced either the classical Community method or its legal output in the EU. The 
presence of the classical Community method and its legal output does not, however, 
exclude the resort to the OMC. On the contrary, traditional legal instruments are 
transforming themselves under the pressure from the newer ones. The use of the OMC 
is not replacing but rather complementing the Community method as a way of 
cooperation beyond the limitations and restrictions associated with the latter. Instead 
to being merely exclusive, their diverging legal forms appear to embody 
complementary principles needed for the conduction of policy: on the one side, 
obligation and credibility, and on the other side, discretion and flexibility. Viewed 
from this angle, their interaction is possible.  
 
Presently, the development of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law hybrids in different EU policy 
sectors is the most likely scenario. This development depends on the levels of 
discretion and obligation needed as well as on the operational conditions present. To 
                                                 
76 Christine Arnold, Madeleine Hosli, Paul Pennings, “Social Policy-Making in the European Union: a 
New Mode of Governance?”, Paper presented at the Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March 11-
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use an ecological metaphor
77, the EU is a normative environment able to sustain 
different populations of rules. Instead of a fierce evolutionary battle involving ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft' law, a certain level of competition and cohabitation of the respective 
populations can be expected at any given moment. Because of the growing 
complexity and maturity of European integration, more hybrid forms of instruments 
and ‘soft’ principles can be expected to develop. The possibility of a creative 
coexistence is voiced in official debates. During the Convention on the Future of 
Europe, this view was strongly expressed:  
 
“The open method of coordination therefore proves to be an instrument of 
integration among others. For the same subject matter and within the limits of 
the treaties, it can therefore be combined with and linked to other instruments 
of Community action, including traditional Community legislative action.”
78  
 
Along similar lines, but from a more academic perspective, Fritz Scharpf highlighted 
the opportunity of combining framework directives with the OMC in order to balance 
political discretion of national governments and supranational legal uniformity
79. 
 
From an instrumental point of view, the most likely scenario involves growing 
interpenetration and hybridization between different kinds of legal instruments, 
according to their effectiveness and capacity to bring home the expected result, rather 
than a homogenous legal style. The effectiveness of these instruments, however, 
depends on the context in which they are embedded and the conditions in which they 
operate. According to the contextual approach, ‘soft’ law, even without having formal 
binding effect, can nonetheless have some effect on the behavior of the parties that are 
subject to these rules, and therefore creates expectations concerning compliance
80. 
Factors other than formal characteristics have to be taken into account while judging 
                                                 
77 Simon Deakin, “Evolution for our time: a theory of legal memetics”, in Michael Freeman, Current 
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Expert Guide to the European Union (Butterworths, 1996) pp. 277-278. This author argues that the 
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the overall dynamics. Consequently, any final evaluation of a regulatory tool depends 
on the features of the policy area under consideration. While a discretionary policy 
design may be acceptable in some areas, particular problems may demand a more 
uniform approach in all member states. Weighing of the relevant criteria has to be 
done on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, such a balancing act is shaped by the 
constellation of interests and actors present in a particular field. In fact, interests of the 
decision-makers as well as their power position in the institutional system determine 
the choice of policy instruments. In addition to that, the functionality of regulatory 
instruments in terms of outcomes and impact is also a factor to be taken into 
consideration. As a consequence, mutual growth and reciprocal cross-fertilization of 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law do not allow for a simple reading and unilateral interpretation of 
their evolution. It is rather subject to the context and configuration of interests in a 
given situation. Therefore, it is not possible to estimate a priori the optimal 





The article argued that the on-going evolution of the legal style of the EU 
fosters complex pluralism in regulatory approaches that can be used to tackle policy 
problems at the European level. This analysis was supported by evidence drawn from 
the field of social policy
82. The argument was presented in several stages. Firstly, the 
article introduced the OMC as part of the integration strategies inside the EU and 
presented its legal peculiarities. Secondly, the origins and development of a ‘soft’ 
brand of the Community law were contextualized in order to highlight the existence of 
different legal styles across EU policy areas. Finally, the article argued that the actual 
practice of European integration departs from the traditional features of the 
Community law and is moving towards a pragmatic mix of different legal techniques.  
 
The main stance of the article is that the EU is a regulatory platform in flux, 
experimenting with the adaptation of an institutional structure geared towards law-
                                                 
81 This perspective is reinforced by findings on international soft law made by a 3-year research project 
summarized in Dinah Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in 
the International Legal System, (Oxford University Press, 2000) 
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making purposes to a system more oriented to policy coordination. As part of a larger 
debate on governance, which was induced by the perceived crisis of legitimacy, the 
EU is experimenting with a variety of different regulatory approaches. As a 
consequence, pressure from new political and functional imperatives generates 
internal tensions. We are witnessing the introduction of new strategies of integration 
by a new generation of decision-makers and policy experts, who are intent on 
reforming the working methods at the European level. In this respect, it is possible to 
observe the emergence of less authoritative, less interventionist, and more 
participatory forms of regulation at the European level. At the same time, the EU as a 
‘regulatory state’, which was originally complementary to the national welfare state
83, 
is gradually changing the scope of its competences. The EU is penetrating into realms 
traditionally reserved for the states, and its coordination tasks are expanding
84. 
 
Regarding the nature of EU policy instruments, they are also evolving from 
authoritative top-down procedures towards more indirect steering mechanisms of 
influence on markets and societies. The process of regulation, particularly, is being 
decentralized, widening formal access to economic and societal actors
85. While this 
trend is a general one in developed economies
86, the EU is especially fertile ground 
for such experiments. Regulatory mechanisms are taking new forms, moving away 
from chains of control and mechanisms of accountability towards more diffused 
responsiveness and self-responsibility. Accordingly, the already complex picture of 
the EU normative environment is enriched by differentiated means of regulation, 
ranging from classical legal instruments of the Community method to ‘softer’ forms 
of policy steering. Nevertheless, the older patterns and instruments are resistant to this 
process, due to their acquired legitimacy, and resilient, due to their institutional 
entrenchment. As a whole, the EU remains a densely regulated institutional 
environment. 
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From the institutional point of view, the Commission and the ECJ have vested 
interests in the path of reform, as this legal evolution could encroach on their position 
in the decision-making system and influence the resources at their disposal. As actors 
in charge of the institutional setting, they act in order to preserve the established order 
and in the process develop narratives and strategies to advance their organizational 
interests.  
 
The EU integrative experiment rests on a dynamic equilibrium of intergovernmental 
and supranational features. The current challenge lies in finding ways to maintain its 
capacity to operate and, at the same time, transform its problem-solving instruments 
to adapt to changing conditions. The case of the OMC and its application within the 
institutional framework of the EU is a particularly good illustration of possible 
solutions to such a challenge. 
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